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Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification:
How and When Should “Significant Proof” Be
Required Post-Dukes?
I. INTRODUCTION
“[P]rocedure is power, whether in the hands of lawyers or judges. . . .
Substantive rights, including constitutional rights, are worth no more
than the procedural mechanisms available for their realization and
protection.”1
Procedural rules often have enormous influence on the outcome
of a case and can effectively deny litigants the opportunity of
reaching the merits.2 Nowhere, perhaps, is this more evident than
with class certifications, which require that plaintiffs seeking to sue as
a group explicitly obtain approval from a court before their joint
claims can go forward. Courts have long recognized that denial of a
class can be the “death knell” for a suit because it decreases plaintiffs’
incentives to sue.3 On the other hand, the granting of class
certification in some cases may also raise the stakes so high that
defendants feel irresistible pressure to settle.4
The potential consequences of low class certification standards
are illustrated by a long line of often conflicting cases, but especially
by the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes.5 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s6 certification of a
1. Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations
on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1292–93 (2000).
2. Id. at 1293.
3. See Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2005); In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Blair v.
Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (“For some cases the denial of
class status sounds the death knell of the litigation, because the representative plaintiff’s claim is
too small to justify the expense of litigation.”).
4. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]lass
certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle . . . . The risk of facing an
all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse
judgment is low.”).
5. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
6. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011).

1259

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 2:13 PM

2011

proposed class represented by six female plaintiffs, who sued for
billions of dollars and alleged that various Wal-Mart employees had
engaged in sex discrimination.7 In an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to present
“significant proof” that they had met the requirement of
commonality, which is a prerequisite for certification.8
Even though Dukes has been laid to rest by the High Court,
lower courts will likely continue to disagree over the level of proof
required for certification because of the factual complexities involved
in applying standards of proof to particular cases and the limited
analysis regarding “significant proof” in the opinion. While Dukes’s
holding and analysis clarify that a “significant proof” standard applies
to plaintiffs seeking to certify a class based on a claim that a
subjective policy of decision making resulted in discrimination, the
opinion does not make clear what that standard should entail and
whether or when it applies outside of a Dukes-like context. Scholars
who have advocated a high standard of proof and addressed the issue
of how far a court can probe into the merits have also neglected to
answer the same questions.9 Thus, this Comment adds to the
existing literature by using Dukes and some of its notable
predecessors as examples to illustrate what a “significant proof”
inquiry should entail and when it should be applied.

7. Id. at 577, 618.
8. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553–54.
9. Many scholars advocate a rigorous analysis of the certification requirements but do
not detail what such an inquiry would involve or under what circumstances it should apply. See,
e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1276 (2002); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of
the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2001); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen:
Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 377
(1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 51 (2004); Seth H. Yeager, Note, In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust
Litigation: Examining the Requisite Levels of Inquiry into the Merits of a Case at the Class
Certification Stage, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563 (2009); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 100 n.11 (2009) (noting
that Geoffrey Miller’s argument for inquiring into the merits has largely been adopted by the
courts). A few articles have attempted to describe some aspects of what such an inquiry might
look like, but none have set forth a comprehensive standard. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Introduction: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 91 (2010); Heather
P. Scribner, Rigorous Analysis of the Class Certification Expert: The Roles of Daubert and the
Defendant’s Proof, 28 REV. LITIG. 71 (2008); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Between
“Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal
Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1042 (2004).
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The next section of the paper, Part II, explains the requirements
for class actions and provides a background on Dukes and the
“significant proof” standard. Part III outlines what a “significant
proof” standard should entail; specifically, it argues that plaintiffs
should be required to prove commonality and typicality by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount of proof should
increase with the size of the class, that a defendant’s objections and
proof on both sides of the case should be considered, and that
Daubert standards should apply. Part IV argues that a “significant
proof” standard should apply outside of the Dukes context to cases
that share elements similar to those present in Dukes. Part V
concludes.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND ON CLASS CERTIFICATION AND
DUKES
A. Requirements for Certification
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for three types of
class actions, each with its own specific requirements.10 But no
matter which type of class action plaintiffs seek, all class action suits
must satisfy the following “prerequisites”: “(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”
(numerosity); “(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class” (commonality); “(3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class” (typicality); and “(4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class” (representativeness).11
This Comment discusses the application of the “significant
proof” standard to the requirements of commonality and typicality,
as these two certification requirements are often the most difficult for
plaintiffs to meet. Courts often discuss these requirements together,
noting that they “tend to merge” because “[b]oth serve as
guideposts for determining whether under the particular
circumstances maintenance of a class is economical and whether the
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that
the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately

10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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protected in their absence.”12 Although the Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to address the “typicality” requirement in Dukes13 and
held only that “significant proof” was necessary for the commonality
requirement, in light of their similarities it seems that a high standard
of proof should apply to both commonality and typicality.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia noted, the commonality and typicality
requirements help determine in part whether “maintenance of a class
is economical.”14 One of the key justifications for permitting class
actions is that they promote judicial economy, as it is often efficient
to hear a large number of similar claims at once.15 However, the
need to fairly and individually assess claims to discover the extent and
nature of any possible liability may outweigh the need for judicial
economy. When a certification standard is too easy to meet, class
actions may actually encourage lawsuits instead of promoting judicial
economy. Plaintiffs may bring suit even when their claims are weak if
they perceive that they are able to certify a broad class and settle
without ever having to prove the merits of their claims.16 Ensuring
the Rule 23 certification requirements of commonality and typicality
are actually met is thus critical to avoid such outcomes.
B. Facts of Dukes and Prior Rulings
The plaintiffs in Dukes, under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, sought to certify a nationwide class of
approximately 1.5 million female employees17 in 3,400 stores in 41
regions.18 They claimed that in comparison with male employees,
female Wal-Mart employees received promotions less frequently,
waited longer for promotions to management positions, and earned

12. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 n.5 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982)).
13. Id. at 2551.
14. Id. at 2551 n.5 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13).
15. Rachel Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of
Monolithic Class Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 71, 73 (2006); Aaron B. Lauchheimer,
Note, A Classless Act: The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 71 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 526 (2005).
16. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Class
certification magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims.”).
17. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
18. Id. at 2546, 2555; Bill Mears, Justices Accept Appeal over Wal-Mart Gender Pay
Lawsuit,
CNN
(Dec.
6,
2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-06/us/
scotus.gender.pay_1_betty-dukes-class-action-wal-mart-stores?_s=PM:US.
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lower pay, even where they had higher performance ratings and
levels of seniority.19 The plaintiffs further asserted that a
decentralized structure of subjective decision making and a strong
“corporate culture” facilitated a companywide policy of
discrimination that “infect[ed], perhaps subconsciously the
discretionary decisionmaking” of every manager at Wal-Mart
“thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one
common discriminatory practice.”20 The proposed class included all
female employees, ranging from part-time workers to salaried
managers, and the women sought billions of dollars in back pay and
punitive damages.21 Some asserted that the class would have been the
largest in United States history if certified.22
The district court certified the class,23 and on appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s certification, holding that the
requirements for commonality and typicality had been met.24 The
Ninth Circuit majority opinion concluded that the plaintiffs had
provided “substantial evidence of Wal-Mart’s centralized firm-wide
culture and policies, thus providing a nexus between the subjective
decision making and the considerable statistical evidence
demonstrating a pattern of lower pay and fewer promotions for
female employees.”25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
issue of whether “claims for monetary relief can be certified
under . . . 23(b)(2)”26 and also asked the parties to “brief and argue

19. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547; see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571,
577 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
20. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547–48.
21. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578.
22. Stephen J. Newman, Dukes v. Wal-Mart and Statistical Proof in Class Certification
Proceedings, CLASS ACTION WATCH at 6, Dec. 2009, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20091208_Newman.CAW.Fall.pdf; Alexandria Sage, Wal-Mart Sex
Discrimination Case Back in Court, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2009, 8:33 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE52O0P820090325; see also Dukes, 131
S. Ct. at 2547 (“We are presented with one of the most expansive class actions ever.”).
23. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578.
24. Id. at 612–13. However, the court also held that the district court erred in certifying
the claim for punitive damages under 23(b)(2) without determining whether monetary relief
predominates. Id. at 621. The court remanded to allow the district court to make this
determination. Id.
25. Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
26. Brief for Petitioner at i, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (No.
10-277), 2010 WL 3355820 at *i.
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the following question: ‘Whether the class certification ordered
under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with 23(a).’” 27
In June of 2011, the Supreme Court issued its decision, WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, reversing certification on two grounds: (1)
on the monetary relief issue, it unanimously held that the back pay
claims “were improperly certified under [Rule] 23(b)(2),”28 and (2)
the Court also held in a 5-4 split that the plaintiffs had not met the
requirements for certification because they failed to establish
commonality.29 This Comment focuses on the split decision and the
standard of proof for meeting the requirements for class certification
under Rule 23.
C. Supreme Court Decision
Before determining whether the class met the requirements for
certification, the Supreme Court first addressed a question that all
courts face when making a certification decision: how far should it
probe into the merits of the case? Prior to Dukes, Supreme Court
guidance in this area had been murky and inconsistent. The two
earlier High Court cases that addressed this question seemed
contradictory. In the first case, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,30 the
Court reasoned, “[w]e find nothing in either the language or history
of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may
be maintained as a class action.”31 However, later in General
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, the Court concluded,
without overruling Eisen, that “sometimes it may be necessary for
the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on
the certification question,”32 and that a class “may only be certified if
the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”33 Because of this

27. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010), (No. 10-277), 2010 U.S.
Lexis 9588, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/120610zor.pdf.
28. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
29. Id. at 2550–57.
30. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
31. Id. at 177.
32. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
33. Id. at 161.
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apparent contradiction, courts often struggled to reconcile these
precedents and applied them inconsistently prior to Dukes.34
The Supreme Court resolved this “split that ha[d] existed for
over two decades”35 by making clear that a court may go as far into
the merits as necessary to determine whether the requirements for
certification have been met. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia,
the majority explained that rigorous analysis will “[f]requently”
involve “some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying
claim,”36 but this “cannot be helped” as “class determination[s]
generally involve[] considerations that are enmeshed in the factual
and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.”37 Scalia
further asserted that having to explore the merits “in order to resolve
preliminary matters . . . is a familiar feature of litigation.”38
Accordingly, the Court had no problem delving into the merits
under the facts of the case, reasoning that the “proof of commonality
necessarily overlap[ed]” with the merits of the plaintiffs’
discrimination claim.39
After resolving the merits issue, the Supreme Court then held
that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for certification
because they did not present “significant proof” that Wal-Mart

34. For example, the First Circuit had asserted that a court can look at the merits insofar
as they touch upon certification requirements; although the certification decision should not
turn into an “‘unwieldy trial on the merits,” courts are not to “put blinders on as to an issue
simply because it implicates the merits of the case.” In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp.
Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.,
432 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2005)). In contrast, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he district court
is not permitted to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s case at the
class certification stage.” Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir.
2006), overruled in part by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir.
2006) (declining to “follow the dictum in Heerwagen suggesting that a district judge may not
weigh conflicting evidence and determine the existence of a Rule 23 requirement just because
that requirement is identical to an issue on the merits”); see also Bone & Evans, supra note 9,
at 1276 (“When a court believes it is important to probe the merits, it will make an effort to
distinguish Eisen, if possible. On the other hand, when . . . a court wishes to avoid a careful
certification analysis—because, for example, the evidence is complex or the benefits of class
treatment are perceived to be substantial—it need only cite Eisen to support its result.”).
35. Brief for Petitioner at I, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010)
(No. 10-277), 2010 WL 3355820 at *i; see also Notes, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title
VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619, 630–31 (1986).
36. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
37. Id. at 2552 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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“operated under a general policy of discrimination.”40 Thus, they
failed to show “the existence of any common question” of law or
fact.41 The Court based42 this standard on a footnote in Falcon
stating that “[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a
general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of
both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself
in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such
as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.”43
The Ninth Circuit had emphatically objected to this standard,
calling it a “hypothetical” in dicta,44 and devoted a whole section of
its opinion to why a “significant proof” standard is unwarranted.45
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the lower appellate
court’s analysis. He emphasized that “[t]he class action is ‘an
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on
46
behalf of the individual name parties only,’” and asserted that “to
justify a departure from that rule” all the requirements of Rule 23
must be met.47 A party seeking class certification “must affirmatively
demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be
prepared to prove that there are, in fact sufficiently numerous
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”48
Overall, the Court’s analysis and holding make clear that a
“significant proof” standard applies to plaintiffs seeking to certify a
class based on a claim that a subjective policy of decision making
resulted in discrimination, as this is what was required in Falcon.49
But the opinion does not make clear what the “significant proof”
standard is, or whether it should apply outside the Dukes context.

40. Id. at 2553.
41. Id. at 2556–57.
42. The “significant proof” standard also hearkens back to Judge Ikuta’s dissent at the
Ninth Circuit. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 603 F.3d 571, 632–33 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
43. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
44. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 594–95.
45. Id.
46. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–701
(1979)).
47. Id. (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403
(1977)).
48. Id. at 2551.
49. Id. at 2553.
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III. WHAT A “SIGNIFICANT PROOF” STANDARD SHOULD ENTAIL
This Comment sets forth some suggestions as to what a
“significant proof” standard ought to include. This Part proceeds,
first, by discussing in detail the Supreme Court’s analysis of the
plaintiffs’ evidence in Dukes to glean any helpful indicia related to
the “significant proof” standard. Then, to recommend a more
detailed, uniform standard, more factors will be derived from what
other circuits have done.
A. The Supreme Court’s Certification Analysis in Dukes
The Supreme Court did not provide detail as to what a
“significant proof” standard should entail specifically, but its
rejection of the proof that the plaintiffs offered provides some
indication of what should be required. First, the Court held that the
sociological expert testimony presented using social framework
analysis was “worlds away” from the “significant proof” required to
show that Wal-Mart had a general policy of discrimination.50 The
sociologist had testified that Wal-Mart “has a ‘strong corporate
culture,’ that makes it ‘vulnerable to gender bias,’” but could not
estimate what percent of employment decisions may have been based
on discrimination.51 This seems to indicate that “significant proof”
requires that experts be held to a high standard, and that a court will
not accept junk science, bald allegations, or even rough conclusions
based on limited evidence. Further, although not reaching the issue,
the Court also signaled that the Daubert standard for admitting
expert testimony52 should apply during the certification stage.53
While the district court had concluded that “Daubert did not apply
to expert testimony at the certification stage,” Justice Scalia stated
that he “doubt[ed] that is so.”54
Second, the Court rejected the statistical evidence showing pay
and promotion disparities, as well as anecdotal accounts of
50. Id. at 2554.
51. Id. at 2553 (internal citations omitted) (explaining that the expert could not say
whether .5 percent or 95 percent of decisions were based on discrimination).
52. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (requiring the
judge to act as a gatekeeper for admitting scientific evidence by ensuring the evidence is
“relevant to the task at hand” and has a “reliable foundation,” meaning it is based on sound
“scientifically valid principles” and methodology).
53. Id. at 2553–54.
54. Id.
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discrimination,55 asserting that such evidence “falls well short” of
showing that “all managers would exercise their discretion in a
common way.”56 The statistical evidence consisted of two regression
studies. One done on the regional level showed gender disparity
when comparing the number of women promoted within the pool of
those who could be promoted with male employees; the other
showed that Wal-Mart promoted a lower percentage of women when
compared with other national retailers.57 The Court rejected this
analysis, explaining that showing disparity at the regional and
national level is not sufficient to “establish the uniform, store-bystore disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality
depends.”58 The opinion further explained that “[e]ven if” the
evidence had established a pattern that differs from other national
promotion and pay figures in each of Wal-Mart’s stores it “would
still not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists” because the
disparity could be based on many different reasons, such as women
being unavailable where Wal-Mart stores are located, few women
being interested in Wal-Mart jobs, few women being qualified, etc.59
Thus, the Court rejected the statistics and studies provided by
the plaintiffs because they did not sufficiently support the plaintiffs’
specific theory that a policy of subjective decision making resulted in
widespread discrimination across multiple regions and Wal-Mart
stores. On a broader level, the implications for future class actions
may be that commonality must be adequately proven, not inferred
using weak or circumstantial evidence. As noted earlier, the Court
reasoned that “a party seeking class certification must affirmatively
demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be
prepared to prove that there are, in fact . . . common questions of
law or fact.”60
The Court also concluded that plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence
“suffers from the same defects” as the statistical evidence because
120 affidavits compared to the potential 1.5 million proposed
members of the class “is too weak to raise any inference that all the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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individual, discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory.”61
The Court compared the evidence in Dukes with a prior case,
Teamsters v. United States, in which the plaintiff provided 40
accounts of discrimination for a class of 334 alleging
discrimination.62 Scalia explained that this represents an anecdote for
one out of every eight members of that class, while the plaintiffs in
Dukes offered one for every 12,500 members.63 Although it seems
unlikely that the Court is looking for a specific amount of evidence,
statistical studies, or ratio of anecdotes to class members, the opinion
does indicate that the larger the proposed class is, the more evidence
will be required to adequately show that commonality and typicality
exist among the class members.
B. What the Standard of Proof Should Entail
Based on both the Dukes opinion and various circuit court
decisions, this Comment recommends that a “significant proof”
standard should entail the following: the amount of proof should
increase with the size of the class, proof on both sides of the case
should be considered, the defendant’s criticisms of the plaintiff’s
proof should be taken into account, and the Daubert standard
should apply. In sum, a court should probe as far into the merits as
necessary to conclude that the certification requirements have been
met by a preponderance of the evidence, with the caveat that any
determination involving the merits of the case should not influence
the court’s final decision but only apply to the certification inquiry.64
1. Nature of the evidence required
“Significant proof” should require that plaintiffs actually prove
that they meet the requirements of commonality and typicality by
61. Id. at 2556.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. This limitation is necessary because when courts assess the merits at the certification
stage the safeguards that are usually present at trial are absent. A few academics have argued
that, because of the substantial policy implications of granting certification and its influence on
the ultimate outcome of the case, a court should do a full inquiry into the merits—including
issues not related to the certification requirements. See, e.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 9, at
1327–29; Hazard, supra note 9; McGuire, supra note 9, at 374–76. However, similar to the
case law and the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551–52, this Comment
argues that an inquiry into the merits should be limited strictly to what is necessary to ensure
the requirements for certification have been met.
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presenting sufficient evidence. This proof can include statistical
evidence and expert testimony as well as direct evidence such as
affidavits and testimonies from class members. Both direct and
indirect types of evidence should be required on a sliding scale,
depending on the quality and quantity of the evidence. For example,
in Dukes this required, as the Supreme Court ruled, sufficient
evidence to prove a pattern or practice of discrimination. Since the
expert testimony and statistical evidence submitted was weak in
Dukes, a substantial number of affidavits relative to the size of the
65
class was required. If, instead, there had been strong statistical
proof that had not been significantly discredited, then only a few
affidavits may have been necessary.
Overall, the amount of proof required (whether direct or
indirect) should also increase with the size of the class. This was
illustrated by the Supreme Court’s criticism of the number of
affidavits that the plaintiffs offered relative to the proposed class size
in Dukes.66 Furthermore, prior to Dukes, other courts had recognized
that the size of the class matters because of the pressure to settle that
a large class may create and because of the difficulty of proving
commonality and typicality in such a case. For example, the Third
Circuit explained that “the unwarranted pressure” that the “size of
the class and number of claims” may create is “a factor we weigh in
our certification calculus.”67 The very feature that makes these
actions efficient (aggregating claims for adjudication) places
substantial settlement pressure on companies, which means courts
typically will never have the opportunity of reaching the merits of
these cases.68 As one scholar explains, encouraging large class actions
“does nothing to advance judicial efficiency. Rather, it simply creates
a gigantically burdensome and threatening legal weapon.”69 To
prevent these negative effects, at the very least, the amount of proof
required ought to increase with the size of the class.

65. See supra Part III.A.
66. See supra Part III.A. The Court implied that there must be a reasonable number of
anecdotes relative to the size of the class (such as one to every ten).
67. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 n.8 (3d
Cir. 2001).
68. This seems true of many types of class actions and not just those in the employment
discrimination context.
69. Sarah Kirk, Ninth Circuit Discrimination Case Could Change the Ground Rules for
Everyone, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 163, 166 (2009).
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2. Rigorous analysis: ensuring that proof is, in fact, significant
Another component of the “significant proof” standard is that
the evidence supporting certification must survive “rigorous
analysis,”70 and thus any legal or factual disputes related to the
prerequisites for certification should be resolved—even if it requires
delving deeply into the merits.71 Courts should not take the
plaintiffs’ claims at face value because Rule 23 is more than “a mere
pleading standard.”72 Instead, courts should consider both the
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ evidence, and respond to any objections
the defendants may have to the plaintiffs’ evidence. Only after such a
process should a court decide if commonality and typicality exist by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The Third Circuit has adopted a similar method, asserting that
the court should “make findings that each Rule 23 requirement is
met or is not met, having considered all relevant evidence and
arguments presented by the parties.”73 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
has held that the “district court must make the necessary factual and
legal inquiries and decide all relevant contested issues prior to
certification.”74 And the Second Circuit has noted that “[a] district
judge is to assess all of the relevant evidence admitted at the class
certification stage to determine whether each Rule 23 requirement
has been met, just as the judge would resolve a dispute about any
other threshold prerequisite for continuing a lawsuit.”75
For example, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court in Dukes seemed to consider Wal-Mart’s objections to the
plaintiffs’ claims in its analysis of the plaintiffs’ sociological expert
testimony. In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Wal-Mart had argued
that the sociological expert’s testimony was “vague” and “imprecise”

70. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel.
Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). Although courts frequently assert that
“rigorous analysis” should be performed, none have really attempted to define what this
should entail.
71. Burch, supra note 9, at 94–96.
72. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
73. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008).
74. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc, 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Before deciding
whether to allow a case to proceed as a class action, therefore, a judge should make whatever
factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.”).
75. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006).

1271

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/15/2011 2:13 PM

2011

and did not prove that stereotyping occurred,76 especially since the
plaintiffs asserted that discrimination resulted from decisions made
by individuals at the store level, yet their statistical analysis was done
on the regional level.77 While the Ninth Circuit seemed to ignore
these objections, the Supreme Court took note. Although not
characterizing them as Wal-Mart’s objections, the Supreme Court
rejected the sociological expert testimony based on Wal-Mart’s
arguments.78
In addition to responding to a defendant’s objections to the
plaintiff’s proof, a court should also consider any counterevidence
that the defendant may offer. Although the Supreme Court did not
discuss it, Wal-Mart also performed its own statistical analysis,
determining that there was no statistically significant difference in
hourly pay between men and women when the analysis was
performed at the sub-store level (i.e., by department).79 The
Supreme Court may not have addressed Wal-Mart’s evidence
because it thought it unnecessary, as it had already found the
plaintiffs’ evidence to be insufficient. Generally, however,
counterevidence should be considered when making a certification
decision. Courts should not avoid resolving whether there was
sufficient proof to support certification by taking the plaintiff’s
statistics at face value and refusing to confront the defendant’s
criticisms, as the Ninth Circuit seemed to do.80 Evidence submitted
by defendants at the certification stage should be carefully considered
and addressed by the court.
When a defendant’s evidence and arguments that challenge the
plaintiff’s proof are not taken into account, courts unfairly favor the
plaintiff.81 Requiring a court to probe far enough into the merits to
ensure Rule 23 requirements have actually been met helps to cabin
the discretion the judge has in assessing the evidence and drives
76. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 601 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2541 (2011)
77. Id. at 604–05.
78. See supra Part III.A.
79. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 637.
80. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it could reject Wal-Mart’s proof because WalMart’s tests were not performed at the store level either. Id. at 608. However, as one of the
dissenting opinions properly noted, this argument is a red herring: “[T]he quality of [WalMart’s] statistics [was] not the issue []; rather, it [was] the plaintiffs’ burden to produce
significant proof of policy of discrimination.” Id. at 638 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
81. See Newman, supra note 22, at 7.
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uniformity in the certification process.82 Otherwise, a judge’s
decision to certify might be unduly influenced by her bias for
plaintiffs, perhaps based on her own political objectives against
certain corporate interests, and the decision could succumb to the
judge’s opinion of the importance of the underlying action.83 One
scholar explains:
A deep and increasingly important trend in contemporary class
certification disputes concerns the degree to which ostensible
battles over conflicting proof on the certification question are the
stalking horse for something else: underlying disputes that often
have little to do with the proof or the facts and everything to do
with the proper meaning of governing law.84

Requiring the court to resolve disputes over the facts and the parties’
evidence supporting commonality and typicality (whether statistical,
direct, or otherwise) restrains the court from making the certification
decision on the basis of anything other than the certification
requirements themselves.
3. Courts should apply Daubert prior to certification
Courts should also apply “Daubert standards” to the expert
testimony that a plaintiff offers to prove commonality and
typicality.85 A “full Daubert” analysis would require the judge to
consider the defendant’s criticisms of the plaintiff’s expert’s
testimony.86 As the Seventh Circuit has argued, merely accepting in
full the plaintiff’s proof when there is conflicting expert testimony (as
the Ninth Circuit did in Dukes), “amounts to a delegation of judicial

82. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871–72 n.28 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the
discovery that may be permitted in order to certify the class), abrogated on other grounds by
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504–05 (2005).
83. Bone & Evans, supra note 9, at 1272 (“Another factor that appears to affect
willingness to probe the merits has to do with the judge’s prior beliefs about the value of the
class action. Judges seem more willing to overlook evidentiary weaknesses and certify a class the
more strongly they believe in the importance of the class action for enforcement of the
substantive law.”).
84. Nagareda, supra note 9, at 101.
85. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (requiring the
judge to act as a gatekeeper for admitting scientific evidence by ensuring the evidence is
“relevant to the task at hand” and has a “reliable foundation,” meaning it is based on sound
“scientifically valid principles” and methodology).
86. See Burch, supra note 9, at 96; Chamblee, supra note 9, at 1042.
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power to the plaintiffs, who can obtain class certification just by
hiring a competent expert.”87
Despite the benefits of applying Daubert at the certification
stage, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to provide clear
guidance on this matter. On the one hand, even though the Court
did not reach the issue of whether Daubert applies because it found
that the sociological testimony offered by plaintiffs was already
insufficient, the opinion seems to signal that Daubert should apply
during certification.88 On the other hand, the Court did not
explicitly overturn the Ninth Circuit’s analysis either, which indicates
that Daubert does not apply.
At the Ninth Circuit, Wal-Mart challenged whether the
sociologist’s expert theory was reliable and criticized his
methodology, alleging that he “misrepresented aspects of the
literature upon which he relied, made unsustainable extrapolations
from that literature, failed to consider evidence that tended to
undermine his theory, and failed to test his data.”89 But the Ninth
Circuit rejected these arguments.90 Although claiming not to reach
the question of whether Daubert applies,91 the Ninth Circuit’s
majority opinion states that Daubert does not have “exactly the same
application at the class certification stage as it does . . . at trial,”92 and
instead asserts that all that is required of the expert is that he
“presents enough of a basis . . . to provide a foundation for his
opinions.” 93 This is because ultimate credibility of the testimony is a

87. West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
88. See supra Part III.A. At least one federal district court judge believes that signal was
sufficiently strong to be unambiguous. See In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82452, at *17 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2011) (asserting that the
Supreme Court “strongly indicated” that Daubert should apply and then applying it to the case
at hand).
89. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 639 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
90. Id.
91. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit majority opinion strongly suggests that Daubert
does not apply pre-certification, it claimed not to actually reach the question, explaining that
even if Daubert did apply it would not help Wal-Mart because Wal-Mart didn’t challenge the
expert’s methodology. Id. at 602 (majority opinion). However, as explained earlier, Wal-Mart
clearly took on the plaintiffs’ expert.
92. Id. at. 603 n.22.
93. Id. at. 602.
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question of the merits, which the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
court should not reach pre-certification.94
Now that the Supreme Court has held that a court may inquire
into the merits as far as necessary to determine that the certification
requirements are met, the better argument is that Daubert should
fully apply at the certification stage, when relevant, to effectively
implement the “significant proof” standard. Unfortunately, however,
because the Dukes decision is not clear lower courts seem likely to
disagree over the proper application of Daubert.
Only weeks after Dukes, for example, the Eight Circuit explicitly
held that a “full” Daubert analysis need not be applied at the
certification stage.95 Instead, the court affirmed the district court’s
application of a “focused” or “tailored” Daubert analysis that
“examined the reliability of the expert opinions in light of the
available evidence and the purpose for which they were offered.”96
In contrast, prior to Dukes, the Second,97 Fourth,98 and Fifth99
Circuits had held in various certification actions not involving
employment discrimination that expert testimony may be rejected if
it fails to meet strict standards. Additionally, the Third100 and
Seventh101 Circuits require both a full Daubert analysis and, more
generally, that a court resolve any factual disputes that exist between
parties prior to certification. For example, the Third Circuit reasoned
that “[t]he district court may be persuaded by the testimony of
94. Id.
95. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13663, at
*13–15 (8th Cir. 2011).
96. Id. at *8, *15.
97. See Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns., 435 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006),
overruled in part by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006)
(declining to “follow the dictum in Heerwagen suggesting that a district judge may not weigh
conflicting evidence and determine the existence of a Rule 23 requirement just because that
requirement is identical to an issue on the merits”); Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d
307, 311, 314 n.13 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s decision to exclude expert
testimony based on Daubert and noting that the court may consider “at least the reliability” of
the testimony at the certification stage).
98. Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 260–63 (4th Cir.
2005) (applying Daubert directly to the facts of the case).
99. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In many cases, it
makes sense to consider the admissibility of the testimony of an expert proffered to establish
one of the Rule 23 elements. . . . [T]he Court must first determine whether Plaintiff’s expert
testimony supporting class certification is reliable.” (citations omitted)).
100. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig, 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008).
101. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2010).
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either (or neither) party’s expert with respect to whether a
certification requirement is met. Weighing conflicting expert
testimony at the certification stage is not only permissible; it may be
integral to the rigorous analysis Rule 23 demands.”102 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit has explicitly applied Daubert, noting that “failing to
clearly resolve the issue of [the expert report’s] admissibility before
certifying the class” is reversible error.103 All of these cases predate
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dukes, but Dukes should only
strengthen their position due to its mandate to implement a high
standard of proof. Based on the Court’s dicta in Dukes and other
circuit court precedent, it seems clear that Daubert is an essential
component of the “significant proof” standard.
4. Preponderance of the evidence
Altogether, the evidence should raise more than an inference of
commonality or typicality and, instead, make out a case for
certification by a preponderance of the evidence.104 Both the Second
and Third Circuits have held that a preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate.105 The Third Circuit, in particular, has
explained that
[c]lass certification requires a finding that each of the requirements
of 23 have been met. Factual determinations necessary to make
Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the
evidence. In other words, to certify a class the district court must
find that the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact
necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23.106

102. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 323.
103. Am. Honda, 600 F.3d at 817–18.
104. Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 149, 151 (2010) (explaining that several circuits have adopted a preponderance of
the evidence standard for meeting the certification requirements).
105. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307; Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension
Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he preponderance of the
evidence standard applies to evidence proffered to establish Rule 23’s requirements.”); cf.
Shepherd v. Babcock & Wilcox of Ohio, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6349, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 3, 2000) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard but also noting that “[o]ne
might argue that a lesser burden, such as establishing a prima facie case that the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied, is applicable, particularly when, as in this litigation, the issue has
been decided on papers without an evidentiary hearing having been conducted”).
106. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (citations omitted).
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Given that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard is the
“typical burden of proof in a civil suit”107 and already has been used
by several federal circuits for certification, it may seem curious that
the Supreme Court did not define Falcon’s “significant proof”
standard as such. One could argue that this oversight implies that
“significant proof” may require more or less than a preponderance of
the evidence. However, requiring a higher standard for class
certification than those same plaintiffs would later face at trial makes
no sense, and requiring less proof would not be sufficient to show
that commonality and typicality exist. Further, as this Comment
recommends, “significant proof” involves more than just the weight
of the evidence, which is what a preponderance of the evidence
describes.108 It also requires a court to rely on a sufficient amount of
evidence relative to the size of the class. And, in addition to allowing
defendants to present their own evidence, it also requires the court
to respond to any objections the defendant may have to the
plaintiffs’ evidence, including applying Daubert.
Some have argued that requiring a preponderance of the
evidence, examining conflicting evidence, and assessing the reliability
of expert testimony amounts to premature litigation of the case; yet
this argument seems even less persuasive in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent holding that examining the merits of the case is
permissible to the extent necessary to assess the standards for
certification.109 As the Eleventh Circuit has asserted, “before a
district court determines the efficacy of class certification, it may be
required to make an informed assessment of the parties’ evidence.
That a trial court does so does not mean that it has erroneously
‘reached the merits’ of the litigation.”110
107. See Chamblee, supra note 9, at 1048 (noting that the preponderance of the evidence
standard is the “typical burden of proof in a civil suit”).
108. A preponderance of the evidence is based on the greater weight or more convincing
part, not the amount of evidence supporting a particular determination. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S
NEW WORLD LAW DICTIONARY, available at http://law.yourdictionary.com/preponderanceof-the-evidence (2010) (defining preponderance of the evidence as “[a] more convincing
amount of evidence than the other side has”). For example, one reliable and knowledgeable
witness may provide a preponderance of the evidence over a dozen witnesses with ambiguous
testimony. However, in a class action with multiple members and claims, the amount of
relevant evidence presented to show commonality and typicality is as critical as the proper
weighing of it.
109. See supra Part II.C.
110. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 712–13 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citation
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006).
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IV. WHERE THE “SIGNIFICANT PROOF” STANDARD APPLIES
In addition to failing to explain what a “significant proof”
standard should entail, the Court also failed to explain to what type
of cases it should be applied. While the opinion largely focused on
applying the standard to employment discrimination cases where
plaintiffs assert that a policy of subjective decision making resulted in
discrimination, this Comment argues that a “significant proof”
standard should apply to other types of cases as well.
Courts have already successfully applied high standards of proof
to class actions outside of the employment discrimination context.
For example, in a Tenth Circuit case, which involved an action
challenging a social security program, the court cited the Falcon
employment discrimination case after explaining that “[a] party
seeking to certify a class is required to show ‘under a strict burden of
proof that all requirements of [Rule] 23(a) are clearly met.’”111
Similarly, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes, a
district court in New York certified a class of plaintiffs seeking to
recover unpaid wages after noting that plaintiffs presented the
“significant proof” necessary to bridge “the ‘conceptual gap’
between an individual’s claim of injury and the existence of a class of
persons who have suffered the same injury.”112
A high level of proof in other contexts is especially compelling
where a court’s certification decision can be justified by reasoning
similar to that in Dukes. Two factors in that decision seemed
essential: (1) the complexity of the claims, and (2) the diversity of
the class. The “significant proof” standard should apply to all cases
which are highly complex and diverse to ensure that the
requirements of commonality and typicality are met. Indeed, prior to
Dukes, some circuit courts had already applied a high standard of
proof to cases sharing these same features, particularly in the
antitrust and tort contexts.
Where a suit meets only one of the two factors noted above,
courts may struggle in deciding whether to require a high level of
proof for certification. In such cases, courts should consider whether

111. Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Rex v. Owens ex
rel. Okla., 585 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1978)).
112. Ramos v. SimplexGrinell LP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65593, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. June
21, 2011) (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes).
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implementing a “significant proof” standard is consistent with the
policy objectives of class actions.
A. Factors Relevant to Ensuring Commonality and Typicality Exist
It is inherently difficult to prove commonality and typicality
where the claims are complex and the class is diverse, and, thus, a
high level of proof should be required in these types of cases.
Although these two factors are also related, they will be discussed
separately.
1. Complexity of the claims
A high standard of proof should apply where the claims are
factually complex. Dukes is a notable example of complexity because
it is inherently difficult to prove that there are common questions of
law and fact when plaintiffs assert that discrimination resulted from
subjective decision making processes. By definition, such a decision
making process is not objective or clearly articulated.113 As Justice
Scalia noted in his opinion, there is a “wide gap” between an
individual asserting that he suffered from discrimination and an
assertion that a class of persons have suffered the same injury and
that his is a typical claim of the class such that there is commonality
among the claims.114 Justice Scalia explained that the claims in Dukes
were fact intensive because even if some decisions were
discriminatory, other managers may have made decisions based on a
wide variety of reasons.115 Some may
select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may

113. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has also held that a mere “policy of leaving
promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower-level supervisors should itself raise
no inference of discriminatory conduct.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
990 (1988).
114. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel.
Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). Falcon also asserted that if substantial
proof of commonality is not required, plaintiffs would be able to turn every instance of
discrimination into a class action suit merely by asserting that one incident of discrimination
occurred and there is “nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended to authorize
such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation.” 457 U.S. at 159. Although all
discrimination, by definition, is against a class, allowing certification based on such allegations
would be too expansive—which is why common questions of law or fact are required.
115. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
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choose to reward various attributes that produce disparate impact—
such as scores on general aptitude tests or educational
achievements. And still other managers may be guilty of intentional
discrimination that produces a sex-based disparity. In such a
company, demonstrating the invalidity of one manager’s use of
discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of
another’s.116

These difficulties are likely why Falcon specified that the “significant
proof” standard applies in cases where there are “entirely subjective
decision making processes.”117
Other cases might similarly have a “wide gap” between proving
an individual claim and showing that there is commonality among
the class because the claims are so complex. For example, tort claims
seeking damages from injuries are often highly fact-intensive and
individualized. Typically, there is extensive variation in (i) how the
alleged injuries were caused (including the number and type of
contributing factors involved, making the claims non-uniform
and/or difficult to prove); (ii) the nature and extent of injuries from
defective products or services; and (iii) the resulting damages
(including loss of wages and impact of any disabilities on future
employment). Thus, in deciding whether to certify tort-based claims
courts have required significant inquiry into the merits of the case. In
a class action products liability case the Seventh Circuit asserted that
“[b]efore deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class
action . . . a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries
are necessary under Rule 23.”118 Courts may also deny certification
when there is a “lack of a track record establishing the merits of the
claim.”119 For example, in In re Rhone-Poulenc, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the certification of a class because the defendants had won
most of the previous suits involving the same products, and because
certification would give too much power to the plaintiffs to pressure
the defendant into settling a case that appeared to be based on a
number of weak claims.120

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Id.
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001).
McGuire, supra note 9, at 385.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Since Dukes, although not explicitly calling it a “significant proof
standard,” a Michigan state court similarly required a high level of
proof in a mass environmental tort case.121 In that case the court
refused to certify a class of 2500 plaintiffs “[b]ased on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart” and concluded that the “plaintiff has
failed to provide this Court with sufficient information” to establish
commonality.122 The court explained that there was an “absence of a
‘glue’ to hold all of the plaintiffs’ claims together” because “whether
and how the individual plaintiffs were injured” by the release of
toxins depends on “highly individualized factual inquires.”123
2. Diversity of the proposed class
In addition to complexity, when a class is broad and diverse,
claiming commonality and typicality is particularly problematic and a
“significant proof” standard is especially necessary. As the
Department of Commerce asserted in its amicus brief in Dukes,
“diversity is the antithesis of typicality.”124
The facts of Dukes illustrate the unique difficulties that a broad
and diverse class can create. As Justice Scalia explained, quoting
Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent at the Ninth Circuit, the members of
the Dukes class
held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s
hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled
across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and
female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed
. . . . Some thrived while others did poorly. They have little in
common but their sex and this lawsuit.125

Commonality and typicality are difficult to prove where a class is
geographically broad. For example, where subjective decision making
involves discretion to implement different policies, it seems unlikely
that if discrimination occurred, it would occur in the same way across
121. Henry v. Dow, No. 03-47777 NZ, slip op. at 3–5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2011).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No.
10-277),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/press/
dukesamicus.pdf.
125. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571,
652 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)).
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thousands of separate stores in varying geographic locations. As one
scholar summarizes,
Usually, the stories involved in these cases have little in common
with each other and each claim would require a full trial on its own
merits to reach the fact-intensive questions about motivation, facts
and circumstances, and adverse impact involved.126

These types of cases are “virtually impossible” for employers to
defend against because they are so “abstract” that “the battle
becomes one-sided.”127
It is also hard to prove commonality and typicality when the class
includes a wide variety of employees. For example, in Bacon v.
Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc., the court denied
certification of a class of all African-American plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs failed to show how managers and workers have the same
interests.128 The court explained, “We view with skepticism a class
that encompasses [] both workers and supervisors . . . . Because class
members have such different jobs, we find it difficult to envisage a
common policy regarding promotion that would affect them all in
the same manner.”129
Further, it is also difficult to show commonality and typicality
when decision making is decentralized. Wal-Mart has a “tiered
managerial system,” where individual store managers have
“substantial discretion” for determining compensation, making it
“virtually impossible for corporate headquarters to control decisions
made at the local level.”130 As decentralized decision making involves
independent decisions made by many autonomous individuals, prior
to the Supreme Court ruling in Dukes many courts already required a
high level of proof in similar types of cases.131 Lower courts
126. Kirk, supra note 69, at 166.
127. Id.
128. 370 F.3d 565, 571 (6th Cir. 2004).
129. Id.
130. Lauchheimer, supra note 15, at 534.
131. See, e.g., Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 267 (D. Md. 2004) (denying
certification where plaintiffs did “not demonstrate a sufficiently cohesive ‘pattern’ to satisfy the
commonality requirement” and failed to show that “centralized decision-making” existed);
Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 567 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (denying
certification of a class of female African-American employees in varying positions in all
departments of the corporation throughout the country and asserting that it “is not possible to
make a finding of commonality where [a] putative class involves extensive diversity in terms of
geography, job requirements, and/or managerial responsibilities”); Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. &
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recognized that establishing commonality is “particularly difficult
where . . . multiple decisionmakers with significant local autonomy
exist.”132 As Wal-Mart’s petition for certiorari asserts,
no other court has ever certified a class of employees who challenge
the exercise of delegated discretion at thousands of facilities where
the claim requires proof of decision making by managers in separate
facilities. This is because the essential elements of the claim,
including discriminatory intent and actual injury, could never be
proven on a class wide basis.133

Like Dukes, other types of cases might similarly involve a diverse
proposed class with a broad geographical scope, where plaintiffs
differ in their relationship with the defendant, and/or there is a
concern of decentralized decision making. For example, in Garcia v.
Johanns the D.C. Circuit applied a high standard of proof where a
group of farmers asserted that the USDA discriminated in its
134
decisions as to who qualified for agency loans. In that case, there
was a similar concern of a broad class and decentralized decision
making that would make it difficult to prove commonality because
the program was administered through local county committees in
135
over 2700 counties across the nation.
The majority explained,
“Following Falcon, we have required a plaintiff seeking to certify a
disparate treatment class under Title VII to make a significant
showing to permit the court to infer that members of the class
suffered from a common policy of discrimination that pervaded all of
the employer’s challenged employment decisions.”136
Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (criticizing the plaintiffs’ “[i]nattention to the
significance of the multi-facility dispersion of the putative class”); Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74
F.R.D. 639, 641–42 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denying certification where the defendant employer
“employed 48,000 persons in [thirty-two] states and [thirteen] countries” because decision
making was too “decentralized”).
132. Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
133. Petition for A Writ of Certiorari at 23 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
795 (2010) (No. 10-277). That is, no one ever certified such a case until the Ninth Circuit did
in Dukes.
134. Garcia, 444 F.3d at 628.
135. Id. at 629.
136. Id. at 631–32 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Love v. Johanns, 439
F.3d 723, 729–30 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1472 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (“[P]laintiffs must make a significant showing to permit the court to infer that
members of the class suffered from a common policy of discrimination that pervaded all of the
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Similarly, in a torts case a federal district court noted its concerns
about the broad nature of a proposed class and the diversity of the
claims and circumstances. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that they
had received injuries as a result of exposure to welding fumes, and
that this had occurred in many locations across the country, resulting
in thousands of injuries.137 The court held that because of the “large
size of the class, the differences in defendants’ conduct, and the
variable working environments in which all of the welder plaintiffs
performed,” the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for
certification.138 Indeed, the court concluded that the claims of the
class members were so “distinct” that class certification was
“inappropriate.”139
B. Other Relevant Policy Considerations
While a “significant proof” standard should clearly apply where
claims are complex and the class is diverse, where one of these factors
is weak or absent, a court may have other reasons to apply a high
standard of proof. Courts should take into account whether the
critical policy considerations for class actions would still be met with
a lower standard of proof and if they are not consider applying the
“significant proof” standard.
Specifically, courts should factor in whether the potential
damages asserted are high, the need for clarity and uniformity, and
whether the class has been pursued under Rule 23(b)(2). Again,
these policy considerations might influence a judge’s decision where
only one of the factors outlined above are present in a case (i.e., the
claims are complex but the class is not diverse, or the class is diverse
but the claims are not complex).

employer’s challenged employment decisions.”).
137. In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 282 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
138. Id. at 303. Class size can often influence both the diversity and complexity of the
case, but is not a separate factor in deciding whether the “significant proof” standard should
apply because a non-diverse, large class with simple claims that are largely uniform would not
require a large amount of proof to meet the requirements of commonality and typicality. And,
as explained earlier, class size is already part of the standard in that it affects how much proof is
required under the “significant proof” standard. See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the
amount of proof required varies with the size of the class).
139. Welding Fume Prods., 245 F.R.D. at 303.
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1. High damages
As a policy matter, class action suits with a potential for high
damages can have significant negative implications for corporations,
even if they are without merit, and thus should be carefully assessed
before they are permitted to go forward. For example, allegations of
back pay and punitive damages for up to 1.5 million employees
would have cost Wal-Mart billions of dollars if proven.140 This
extensive potential liability would be especially damaging to smaller
corporations. Notably, the Federal Rules now permit an immediate
interlocutory appeal of the certification decision “in recognition of
the fact that a class certification almost always dictates the outcome
in these cases—a forced settlement.”141
When potential damages are high and there is significant pressure
placed on the defendant to settle, some of the traditional
justifications for allowing class actions are weak or absent. One of the
primary rationales for class action suits is to provide a mechanism for
aggregating small private claims that would likely never be brought
on their own because of the costs involved in pursuing a lawsuit.142
In some types of cases, “[f]ailure to have a proposed class certified
may sound the ‘death knell’ of a class action lawsuit as it virtually
eliminates the incentive of at least some plaintiffs to pursue their
claims because their potential individual damages are small relative to
the costs of litigation.”143 However, this justification is not as
persuasive where claims are large. These types of claims could likely
easily be brought as individual suits, regardless of whether they are
based on subjective decision making in the employment
discrimination context or otherwise.144

140. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 617 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2541 (2011).
141. Kirk, supra note 69, at 167; see also Bone & Evans, supra note 9, at 1255 (“In many
cases, the mere decision to certify creates intense pressure for defendants to settle, and this
settlement leverage makes the class action attractive to plaintiffs with frivolous and weak
claims.”).
142. Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1385–86 (2000); Rachel
Tallon Pickens, Too Many Riches? Dukes v. Wal-Mart and the Efficacy of Monolithic Class
Actions, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 71, 73–74 (2006).
143. Pierre Cremieux, Ian Simmons & Edward A. Snyder, Proof of Common Impact in
Antitrust Litigation: The Value of Regression Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939,
939 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Cf. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON
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Cases in other areas of the law besides employment
discrimination frequently involve high damages. For example, in tort
cases where livelihood is impacted, compensatory damages will be
high, and punitive damages may also be significant. In a products
liability case where the defendants faced up to $25 billion dollars in
damages the Seventh Circuit referred to these large class actions as
“blackmail settlements.”145 Accordingly, as there is less concern in
many cases within the tort context that denying certification would
be a death knell for claims, a high level proof is often required.146
Courts have also required a high level of proof in the antitrust
context in part because there is significant concern that certification
may impose enormous pressure on a corporation to settle, even
when the claims are weak, due to the huge damages that may be
imposed.147 One study relates that “[g]iven the uncertainties
associated with the legal process, as well as the provisions for treble
damages and one-way fee shifting in favor of successful plaintiffs,
[antitrust] class certification often results in large settlements.”148
Accordingly, in antitrust suits, certification often “turns on the
plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate impact from the alleged violation
using common proof on a class-wide basis.”149 For example, the
Third Circuit held that “the decision to certify a class calls for
findings by the court, not merely a ‘threshold showing’ by a party,
that each requirement of Rule 23 is met.”150 The court also quoted
Falcon in reasoning that “[c]lass certification is proper only ‘if the
trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’
of Rule 23 are met.”151 Similarly, the First Circuit has explained in an
L. REV. 813, 842 (2004) (asserting that judges and academics have argued that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 “increased the value of individual plaintiff’s claims, and therefore made
individual suits more likely,” but arguing that the burden of proof changes when a plaintiff
brings a claim individually). This same reasoning could also apply to other types of class actions
where the damages sought are high.
145. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)); see also Daniel
F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2001
BYU L. REV. 305, 314 (2001).
146. See infra, Part IV.A.1.
147. Yeager, supra note 9, at 577 (allowing courts to inquire into the merits in the
antitrust context could “protect defendants from unfair settlement pressure”).
148. Cremieux, Simmons & Snyder, supra note 143, at 939.
149. Id.
150. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).
151. Id. at 309 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)).
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antitrust case that if the premises for the class are disputed, a court
may “probe behind the pleadings” in order to assess whether the
proposed class meets the legal requirements for certification.152
When significant damages are alleged, a low certification
standard for determining commonality and typicality could result in
“the balance of power shifting substantially in favor of employees
and against employers and [the imposition of] significant additional
cost to United States businesses, employees, and consumers.”153 Or,
in the antitrust context, the power would shift to inefficient
competitors, and in the tort context, to disgruntled (but uninjured)
consumers.
Instead, certifying classes only where evidence of commonality
and typicality is relatively clear will decrease the ability of plaintiffs to
impose unjustified damages on defendants. For example, in a Dukestype context plaintiffs who fail to certify will have to proceed
individually and prove discrimination and the resulting harm from
each employment practice.154 Or if applied in the torts context,
plaintiffs would be forced to prove injury and damages separately if
there was nothing to tie their claims together.
This would ensure that cases really are resolved based on the
merits, and the result will be much more likely to be accurate and
equitable. As Intel explained in the amicus brief it filed with the
Supreme Court for Dukes, when claims are brought individually, the
defendant can be assured that, on average, the correct result will
occur because errors will be distributed across cases.155 However,
“[i]n a class action, the defendant is forced to gamble all at once
against thousands or even millions of opponents. . . . Because the
price of a single error (however remote the prospect) could be
[millions or billions] . . . [t]he only rational strategy is to settle.”156

152. In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir.
2008) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160).
153. Kirk, supra note 69, at 164.
154. Id.
155. Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-277), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/10_277_brief_up
dates/10-277_PetitionerAmCuIntelCorp.authcheckdam.pdf.
156. Id.; see also McGuire, supra note 9, at 371 (“[A] small degree of risk—e.g., ten
percent—can lead to a substantial settlement if the aggregate class claims are in the million or
billion-dollar range.”).
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Courts should not ignore the pressure that an enormous class
with significant damage claims will create, regardless of the type of
class action at issue.
2. Uniformity and clarity
As was just illustrated, many courts have applied various versions
of a significant-proof type standard to different types of cases. Thus,
applying the same standard every time the Rule 23 prerequisites are
assessed for at least the types of cases outlined above would increase
clarity and uniformity. Where claims are complex or the class is
diverse, courts should consider applying the “significant proof”
standard outlined earlier in this paper.
Upon review, appellate courts should ensure that any
certification decision below was based on a clear and a specific
standard so that they can more easily determine if the certification
requirements were met. This would help cabin judicial discretion in
making the certification decision (which has a large impact on the
ultimate outcome of the case). Otherwise judges would have room
to grant certifications at will, essentially failing to apply the Rule 23
requirements by giving them only lip service.157 For instance, judges
could decide certification issues based largely on “the value of the
class action.”158 Indeed, several scholars have found that some judges
may be “more willing to overlook evidentiary weaknesses” if they
“believe in the importance of the class action for enforcement of the
substantive law.”159 All of this would be prevented by implementing
a uniform high standard of proof to all class certifications with large
class sizes involving complex or diverse claims and requesting
significant damages, as these types of cases are sufficiently similar to
the employment discrimination context and the Dukes ruling.
The argument could also be made that the same standard should
apply to all certifications regardless of the complexity of the claims
157. Bone & Evans, supra note 9, at 1270–71.
158. Id. at 1272.
159. Id. This may have been what occurred in Dukes. Both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit avoided the strict inquiry required by 23(b)(2) by asserting that a court should
not probe too far into the merits. However, this refusal to probe sufficiently behind the
pleadings seemed, in effect, to be a refusal to admit that the claims lacked commonality—i.e.,
the plaintiffs were promoted and demoted for a variety of reasons, and thus their claims should
have been assessed individually. Perhaps this was because the court believed in the inherent
value of the class action, wanting it to go forward so the discrimination claims could be heard
regardless of whether the plaintiffs actually met the certification requirements.
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and diversity of the class because the same prerequisites apply to
every case. Certainly, a preponderance of the evidence standard
should always be used to weigh the proof available. However the
question is whether, for the sake of clarity and uniformity, the proof
that is weighed for certification should be “significant” (i.e., also
increase with the size of the class and be subjected to Daubert
standards) even in simpler, less diverse cases where the damages
alleged are not high. In such cases that might stretch the bounds of
Dukes too far by, in essence, allowing a full blown pretrial on the
merits instead of just requiring courts to “conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits”160 or “probe behind the pleadings before
coming to rest on the certification question.”161 In brief, applying
Dukes’s “significant proof” holding to all cases may overreach the
benefits of a high standard of proof.
3. Suits brought under Rule 23(b)(2)
Another consideration that courts should weigh in deciding
when to apply a “significant proof” standard is whether, like Dukes,
the class is pursued under Rule 23(b)(2), which has less stringent
standards than the other two types of class actions. The Supreme
Court in Dukes held that the plaintiffs’ claims were inappropriately
certified under 23(b)(2).162 The Court explained that “individualized
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)” because “[t]he procedural
protections attending the (b)(3) class—predominance, superiority,
mandatory notice, and the right to opt out—are missing from
(b)(2).”163 Further, it reiterated that “[i]n the context of a class
action predominately for money damages we have held that the
absence of notice and opt out violates due process.”164 This can be a
serious problem if some members of a class have stronger claims than
others and would fare better by litigating their claims individually
but are dragged into a broad class action created by a lower standard
of proof.165
160. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (emphasis added).
161. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 2558–59.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2559 (citing Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)).
165. See Sarah Dale, Note, Reconsidering the Approach to 23(b)(2) Employment
Discrimination Class Actions in Light of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 38 CONN. L. REV. 967, 967
(2006).
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The same concerns could arise, however, where a class of
plaintiffs pursues primarily injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule
23(b)(2). For certain class members, monetary damages rather than
equitable relief may be more meaningful, and the lack of due process
protections in 23(b)(2) puts them at a disadvantage. Or some class
members may have stronger claims than others. Thus, to better
protect plaintiffs, a “significant proof” standard should be applied to
injunctive or declaratory relief cases where meaningful monetary
damages could be asserted by individual plaintiffs but are not
asserted by the class. In brief, courts should be wary of all 23(b)(2)
class actions because giving notice to all class members is not
required, and members of the class cannot opt out.
The lack of certain due process protections in 23(b)(2) that are
available under 23(b)(3) affects defendants as well, irrespective of the
nature of the case. Simply put, 23(b)(2) generates more lawsuits
given its easier certification requirements. Indeed, plaintiffs alleging
employment discrimination “have made aggressive use of Rule
23(b)(2).”166
Additionally, some scholars have asserted that Congress never
intended for 23(b)(2) class actions to be used in the expansive way
that they are today.167 Two scholars have argued that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are based on historical antecedents, and the
historical antecedent of 23(b)(2) involved class-wide injunctions to
prohibit racial segregation.168 Another has claimed similarly that
23(b)(2) was primarily created to provide a mechanism for obtaining
an injunction against future discrimination.169 Overall, 23(b)(2)
actions were originally permitted to grant equitable relief against
conduct directed towards the class as a whole, rather than individual
members, and were not to be used to provide compensatory
damages,170 as the Supreme Court held.171 Employment

166. Mark A. Perry & Rachel S. Brass, Rule 23(B)(2) Certification of Employment Class
Actions: A Return to First Principles, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 681, 681 (2010).
167. Cf. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159.
168. Perry & Brass, supra note 166, at 681.
169. Roger H. Trangsrud, James F. Humphreys Complex Litigation Lecture: The Adversary
System and Modern Class Action Practice, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 185 (2008).
170. Perry & Brass, supra note 165, at 687, 701, 704. There is an abundance of scholarly
debate over whether punitive damages and back pay should be allowed for 23(b)(2) actions,
but this debate is beyond the scope of this Comment.
171. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558–59 (2011).
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discrimination suits, typically for monetary damages,172 or even
antitrust or tort suits pursuing injunctive relief differ greatly from
historical de jure segregation and equitable actions, and thus likely
are a use of 23(b)(2) that Congress did not foresee.173 Where
23(b)(2) class actions are permitted due to more relaxed certification
standards and historically overbroad application to a wide variety of
cases, a court should at the very least consider applying a high
standard of proof to protect both plaintiffs and defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the certification decision can have such enormous
consequences for the ultimate outcome of the case, the nature of the
“significant proof” standard and when it should apply needs to be
made clear. Based on the Supreme Court decision in Dukes and
other circuit court precedent, such a standard should require (i) that
the amount of proof required increase with the size of the class, (ii)
that defendant(s)’ legal and factual objections and any relevant
counterevidence offered by defendant be considered, (iii) that a full
Daubert analysis is applied, and (iv) that ultimately plaintiffs prove
commonality and typicality by a preponderance of the evidence.
Further, the “significant proof” standard should apply to other
types of cases outside the employment discrimination context that,
like Dukes, involve complex claims and a diverse class. Where one of
these factors is weak or missing courts should also take into account
policy considerations, such as whether (i) the alleged damages are
high, (ii) implementing the standard well help increase uniformity
and clarity, and (iii) the class is being pursued under Rule 23(b)(2).
A number of jurisdictions have already applied various versions of a
“significant proof” standard in cases with these features.
Overall, the debate over the amount of proof required for class
certifications demonstrates that the line between procedure and
substance is becoming increasingly hazy. “Significant proof” ensures
that the benefits of class certification, including cost-sharing and
efficiency, actually materialize by requiring adequate evidence that
172. Although the Supreme Court has discouraged “judicial inventiveness” in class action
suits, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620, 629 (1997), 23(b)(2)
certifications for employment discrimination suits have nonetheless been broadly allowed and
even confirmed by the Supreme Court on several occasions, as evidenced by Eisen and Falcon.
173. Perry & Brass, supra note 166, at 682. The article also notes that tort actions, which
are also often certified under 23(b)(2), are also a use that Congress did not foresee. Id.
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shows commonality and typicality among claims clearly exists,
whether in the employment context or otherwise. When a procedural
decision can result in a forced settlement that could cost a company
billions of dollars and possibly prevent some litigants from pursuing
what may be stronger individual claims, requiring a “significant
proof” standard is critical to ensuring that substantive rights are
adequately protected and justice is eventually done.
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